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Abstract
Dynamic Fault Trees (DFT) and Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams
(DRBD) are two modeling approaches that capture the dynamic failure behavior
of engineering systems for their reliability analysis. Recently, two independent
higher-order logic (HOL) formalizations of DFT and DRBD algebras have been
developed in the HOL4 theorem prover. In this work, we propose to integrate
these two modeling approaches for the efficient formal reliability analysis of com-
plex systems by leveraging upon the advantages of each method. The soundness
of this integration is provided through a formal proof of equivalence between the
DFT and DRBD algebras. We show the efficiency of the proposed integrated
formal reliability analysis on a drive-by-wire system as a case study.
Keywords— Dynamic Reliability Block Diagrams, Dynamic Fault Trees, Integrated
Formal Framework, Theorem Proving, HOL4
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1 Introduction
Dynamic reliability models, such as dynamic fault trees (DFTs) [1] and dynamic reli-
ability block diagrams (DRBDs) [2], enable modeling the failure dependencies among
system components by using DFT gates, such as Functional DEPendency (FDEP)
gate, and DRBD constructs, like the spare construct. DRBDs consist of blocks that
represent system components and connectors to model the successful paths or multiple
paths from the input to the output. These paths determine the required system com-
ponents to maintain its proper functionality. DFTs, on the other hand, graphically
model the faults of system components that lead to the failure of an undesired event,
represented by a top event. The required conditions for the occurrence of this top
event are captured using DFT gates. An algebra was proposed in [1] for the analysis
of DFTs, where inputs and outputs of DFT gates are modeled based on their time of
failure. In [3], we developed the higher-order logic (HOL) formalization of this algebra
and verified the probability of failure of commonly used DFT gates, which enables
conducting a formal DFT analysis within the HOL4 theorem prover [4].
Following the same lines of the DFT algebra, we recently proposed an algebra to
analyze DRBDs with spare constructs [5]. We introduced new DRBD operators that
allow expressing the structure of a given DRBD to conduct its analysis. We devel-
oped the HOL formalization of this algebra using HOL4 to ensure its soundness. It is
worth mentioning that the graphical representation of the sources of failure of a system
modeled as a DFT cannot be directly obtained using DRBDs. Such a graphical repre-
sentation is quite helpful in quickly identifying the vulnerabilities in systems. On the
other hand, DRBDs identify the required paths and options for the successful behavior
that cannot be directly identified using DFTs. However, the DRBD algebra leads to a
more efficient reliability analysis since the DRBD algebra is simpler to conduct.
In this work, we propose an integrated framework that enables formally analyzing
DFTs and DRBDs based on their algebraic approaches. The proposed framework also
allows the formal analysis of DRBDs using the DFT algebra and vice-versa, which
requires verifying the formal equivalence of both algebras. The proposed integration
provides the possibility to express the failure behavior of a system modeled as a DRBD
and the success behavior of a system modeled as a DFT. Moreover, using the integrated
framework, a given DFT can be formally modeled using the formalized DFT algebra.
Then, based on the formal equivalence of the DFT and DRBD algebras, we can obtain
the corresponding DRBD model of the given system in a sound manner and thus use
the DRBD model to conduct the formal reliability analysis. As an illustration, we for-
mally analyze the reliability analysis of a drive-by-wire (DBW) system [6] using both
reliability models and show that the DRBD algebra based formal analysis results in a
shorter proof script and a smaller number of proof goals, and thus a reduction in the
time required to conduct the analysis (by 1/24 for the DBW system).
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Table 1: Definitions of DFT Temporal Operators
Operator Mathematical Expression Formalization
Before ACB =
{
A, A < B
+∞, A ≥ B
` ∀ A B. D BEFORE A B =
(λs. if A s < B s then A s
else PosInf)
Simultaneous A∆B =
{
A, A = B
+∞, A 6= B
` ∀ A B. D SIMULT A B =
(λs. if A s = B s then A s
else PosInf)
Inclusive Before AEB =
{
A, A ≤ B
+∞, A > B
` ∀ A B. D INCLUSIVE BEFORE A B =
(λs. if A s ≤ B s then A s
else PosInf)
2 DFT Algebra and its HOL Formalization
The algebraic approach of DFT analysis relies on presenting the basic events, which
represent system components, and the output of DFT gates based on their time of
failure [1]. Identity elements are defined to express two states of system components.
The ALWAYS element represents a component that already failed, i.e., the time of
failure equals 0. The NEVER element models a fail safe component, which means
that its time of failure equals +∞. Three temporal operators are also introduced,
i.e., Before (C), Simultaneous (∆) and Inclusive-before (E), to model the dynamic
behavior of one event failing before the other, at the same time and before or at
the same time, respectively [1]. In [3], we provided the HOL formalization of these
operators (Table 1), where we defined them as lambda abstracted functions that
return extended-real numbers (extreal), which include real numbers and ±∞ to
model the NEVER element.
In [1], the DFT gates, shown in Figure 1, are modeled based on the time of failure
of their output. For instance, the Functional DEPendency (FDEP) gate is used to
model failure triggers of system components. The spare gate models spare parts in a
system, where the spare (X) replaces a main part (Y ) after its failure. In the general
case, the failure distribution of the spare is attenuated by a dormancy factor from the
active state. Therefore, in the DFT algebra, two variables are used to distinguish the
(a) OR (b) AND (c) FDEP (d) PAND (e) Spare
Figure 1: Fault Tree Gates
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Table 2: DFT Gates Expressions and Probability of Failure
Gate Mathematical Expression Probability of Failure
AND X · Y = max(X,Y ) FX(t)× FY (t)
OR X + Y = min(X,Y ) FX(t) + FY (t)− FX(t)× FY (t)
PAND QPAND =
{
Y, X ≤ Y
+∞, X > Y
∫ t
0
fY (y) FX(y) dy
FDEP X + Y = min(X,Y ) FX(t) + FY (t)− FX(t)× FY (t)
Spare
QSP =Y · (Xd C Y ) +Xa · (Y CXa)
+Y∆Xa + Y∆Xd
∫ t
0
(∫ t
v
f(Xa|Y=v)(u)du
)
fY (v)dv+∫ t
0
fY (u)FXd(u)du
spare in both its states; active (Xa) and dormant (Xd). Table 2 lists the definitions
of these gates. In [3], we provided the HOL formalization of these gates. However, to
verify the probability of failure expression given in Table 2, it is required first to define
a DFT event to be used in the probabilistic analysis. This is formally defined as [3]:
Definition 1. ` ∀p X t. DFT event p X t = {s | X s ≤ Normal t} ∩ p space p
where p is a probability space. p space is a function that returns the space of p. X
is the time to failure function that can represent inputs and outputs of DFT gates
and t is the time until which we are interested in finding the probability of failure.
The type of t is real, while the time to failure functions are of type extreal and
thus it is required to typecast t to extreal using the Normal function. We verified
the probability of failure of all DFT gates based on this event and using their formal
definitions, as given in Table 2 [3].
As an example, we provide the details of analyzing the DFT of a drive-by-wire
system (DBW) [6], shown in Figure 2, to explain the required steps to use our
Figure 2: DFT of Drive-by-wire System
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formalized algebra. This system is used in modern vehicles to control its functionality
using a computerized controller. We provide the reliability model of the brake and
throttle subsystems. The throttle system fails due to the failure of the throttle (TF )
or the engine (EF ). The brake control unit (BCU) failure leads to the failure of this
system. A spare gate is used to model the failure of a primary control unit (PC) with
a warm spare (SC). Finally, the system can fail due to the failure of the throttle
sensor (TS) or the brake sensor (BS).
To formally conduct the analysis using our formalization, it is required first to
express the function of the top event algebraically as:
QDBW = (TF + EF) + BCU + WSP PC SCa SCd + (TS + BS)
Then, we create a DFT event for QDBW as: DFT event p QDBW t, and verify that it
equals the union of the individual DFT events, i.e.:
DFT event p TF t ∪ DFT event p EF t ∪ DFT event p BCU t ∪ DFT event p
(WSP PC SCa SCd) t ∪ DFT event p TS t ∪ DFT event p BS t
Thus, we can use the probabilistic principle of inclusion and exclusion (PIE) [1] to
verify the probability of failure of QDBW. The probabilistic PIE expresses the probability
of the union of events as the continuous summation and subtraction of the probabilities
of combinations of intersection of events. The DBW example is represented as the
union of six events, therefore, applying the probabilistic PIE results in having 63 dif-
ferent terms in the final expression. We verify the probability of failure of the DBW as:
Theorem 1.
` ∀BS TS BCU PC SCa SCd EF TF p t fPC f(SCa|PC) fSCaPC. 0 ≤ t ∧
dbw event req [BS; TS; BCU; PC; SCa; SCd; EF; TF] p t fPC f(SCa|PC) fSCaPC ⇒(
prob p (DFT event p QDBW t) =
FTF(t)+FEF(t)+FBCU(t)+
[ ∫ t
0
fPC(pc)×
( ∫ t
pc
f(SCa|PC=pc)(sca) dsca
)
dpc
]
+FBS(t)+FTS
-...+...- FTF(t)×FEF(t)×FBCU(t)×FBS(t)×FTS(t)×[(∫ t
0
fPC(pc)×
( ∫ t
pc
f(SCa|PC=pc)(sca)dsca
)
dpc
)
+
∫ t
0
fPC(pc)×FSCd(pc) dpc
])
where dbw event req ensures the required conditions for independence of the events
and defines the conditional density functions with their proper conditions [7]. The
first six terms in the conclusion of Theorem 1 represent the probabilities of the six
individual events of the union of the DBW. Since there are 63 different terms, we are
only showing a part of the theorem and the full version is available at [7]. The script
of the DBW DFT analysis required around 4850 lines of code and 24 man-hours to be
developed.
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Table 3: Definitions of DRBD Operators
Operator Mathematical Expression Formalization
AND X · Y = min(X,Y ) ` ∀X Y. R AND X Y =
(λs. min (X s) (Y s))
OR X + Y = max(X,Y )
` ∀X Y. R OR X Y =
(λs. max (X s) (Y s))
After X B Y =
{
X, X > Y
+∞, X ≤ Y
` ∀X Y. R AFTER X Y =
(λs. if Y s < X s then X s
else PosInf)
Simultaneous X∆Y =
{
X, X = Y
+∞, X 6= Y
` ∀X Y. R SIMULT X Y =
(λs. if X s = Y s then X s
else PosInf)
Inclusive After X D Y =
{
X, X ≥ Y
+∞, X < Y
` ∀ X Y. R INCLUSIVE AFTER X Y =
(λs. if Y s ≤ X s then X s
else PosInf)
3 DRBD Algebra and its HOL Formalization
DRBDs capture the dynamic dependencies among system components using DRBD
constructs, such as the spare and load sharing constructs. The blocks in a DRBD
can be connected in series, parallel, series-parallel and parallel-series. Recently, we
proposed an algebra that allows expressing the structure of a given DRBD based on
system blocks [5]. The reliability of a given system can be expressed using this DRBD
algebra. We defined several operators that enable expressing DRBDs of series and
parallel configurations and even more complex structures. Furthermore, the defined
operators allow modeling a DRBD spare construct to capture the behavior of spares in
a system. We provided the HOL formalization of this algebra to ensure its soundness
and enable the formal analysis using HOL4. We first formally define a DRBD event
that creates the set of time until which we are interested in finding the reliability [5]:
Definition 2. ` ∀p X t. DRBD event p X t = {z | Normal t < X s} ∩ p space p
where X is the time to failure function of a system component and t is the moment
of time until which we are interested in finding the reliability of the system. The
probability of this event represents the reliability of the system until time t [5]:
Definition 3. ` ∀p X t. Rel p X t = prob p (DRBD event p X t)
Then, we verify that its probability is related to the CDF [5].
We introduced DRBD identity elements and operators to model both the combi-
natorial and dynamic behaviors, as listed in Table 3. The idea is similar to the DFT
algebra, where the blocks are modeled based on their time of failure. We need to recall
that DRBDs are concerned in modeling the successful behavior, i.e., the “not failing”
behavior, and thus we can use the time to failure functions to model the behavior of a
given DRBD. We defined two identity elements for DRBD that are similar to the DFT
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Figure 3: DRBD Spare Construct
Table 4: Mathematical and Reliability Expressions of Spare Constructs
Math. Model Reliability
QSP = (Xa B Y ) · (Y BXd) RSP (t) =1−
∫ t
0
∫ t
y
f(Xa|Y=y)(x) fY (y)dxdy
−
∫ t
0
fY (y)FXd(y)dy
elements, i.e., ALWAYS = 0 and NEVER = +∞. The DRBD operators are listed in
Table 3. The AND operator (·) models series DRBD blocks, where it is required that
all the blocks are working. The output of the AND operator fails with the first failure
of any component of its inputs. On the other hand, the OR operator (+) models par-
allel structures, where at least one of the blocks should continue to work to maintain
the system functionality. To capture the dynamic behavior, we introduced three tem-
poral operators, i.e., After, Simultaneous and Inclusive-after [5]. The after operator
(B) models the sequence of events, where the system continues to work as long as one
component continues to work after the failure of the other. The simultaneous operator
(∆) is similar to the one of the DFT algebra, where its output fails when both inputs
fail at the same time. Finally, the inclusive-after operator (D) combines the behavior
of both after and simultaneous operators. We provided the HOL formalization of these
elements and operators based on lambda abstracted functions and extreal numbers.
The mathematical expressions and the HOL formalization are listed in Table 3. The
reliability expressions of these operators are available at [5].
A spare construct, shown in Figure 3, is introduced in DRBDs to model spare parts
in systems by having spare controllers that activate the spare after the failure of the
main part. In Table 4, Y is the main part and after its failure X is activated. We use
two variables (Xa, Xd), like the DFT algebra.
DRBD blocks can be connected in series, parallel and more nested structures. We
provide here the details of only the series and parallel structures, as listed in Table 5.
Table 5: Mathematical Models and Reliability of Series and Parallel Structures
Math. Model Reliability
Series
⋂n
i=1(event (Xi, t))
∏n
i=1RXi(t)
Parallel
⋃n
i=1(event (Xi, t)) 1−
∏n
1=1(1−RXi(t))
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Details about the nested structures can be found in [5]. The series structure, shown
in Table 5, continues to work as long as all the blocks are working. Once one of these
blocks stops working, then the entire system stops as well. It can be expressed using
the AND operator. Its mathematical model is expressed as the intersection of the
individual DRBD events [8]. The parallel structure, shown in Table 5, is composed of
several blocks that are connected in parallel. Its structure function can be expressed
using the OR operator. Its mathematical model is represented using the union of the
individual DRBD events. We developed the HOL formalization of these structures
and verified their reliability expressions assuming the independence of the individual
blocks [5].
We demonstrate the applicability of the DRBD algebra in the formal analysis of
the DRBD of the DBW system given in Figure 4. This DRBD is a series sructure with
one spare construct to model the main part PC that is replaced by SC after failure.
The structure function of the DBW DRBD (FDBW ) can be expressed as:
FDBW = TF · EF ·BCU · (SCa B PC) · (PC B SCd) · TS ·BS (1)
Then, we verify the reliability of the DBW system as:
Theorem 2. ` ∀p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t.
DBW set req p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t ⇒
(prob p (DRBD event p FDBW t) =
Rel p TF t * Rel p EF t * Rel p BCU t * Rel p (R WSP PC SCa SCd) t *
Rel p TS t * Rel p BS t)
where DBW set req ascertains the required conditions for the independence of the
DBW system blocks [5]. The reliability of the spare construct can be further rewritten
using the reliability expression of the spare using integrals. The script of the reli-
ability analysis of the DBW DRBD is 150 lines long and required only one hour of work.
Figure 4: DRBD of Drive-by-wire System
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4 Integrated Framework for Formal DFT-DRBD
Analysis
The proposed framework integrating DFT and DRBD algebras is depicted in Figure 5.
It can be utilized to conduct both DFT and DRBD analyses using the HOL formalized
algebras and allows formally converting a DFT model into its corresponding DRBD
based on the equivalence of both algebras. The analysis starts by a given system
description that can be modeled as a DFT or DRBD. Formal models of the given
system can be created based on the HOL formalized algebras. The DRBD model can
be analyzed as described in Section 3, where a DRBD event is created and its reliability
is verified based on the available verified theorems of DRBD algebra. On the other
hand, a DFT model can be analyzed using the formalized DFT algebra, which requires
dealing with the probabilistic PIE. Furthermore, the DRBD model can be converted
to a DFT to model the failure instead of the success, then this model is analyzed using
the DFT algebra. Similarly, the DFT model can be analyzed by converting it to its
counterpart DRBD model, which results in an easier process as the PIE is not invoked.
In order to handle the DFT analysis using DRBD algebra and the DRBD analysis
using the DFT algebra, it is required to be able to represent the DRBD of the cor-
responding DFT gates using the DRBD algebra and vice-versa (the equivalence proof
in Figure 5). According to [9], the OR, AND and FDEP gates can be represented
using series, parallel and series RBDs, respectively. Therefore, they can be modeled
using AND and OR operators, while the spare gate corresponds to the spare construct.
Finally, the PAND gate can be expressed using the inclusive after operator (Y DX).
However, we need to formally verify this equivalence to ensure its correctness. In Ta-
ble 6, we provide the theorems of equivalence of DFT gates and DRBD operators and
constructs, where D AND, D OR, FDEP, P AND and WSP are the names of the AND, OR,
FDEP, PAND and spare DFT gates in our HOL formalization [3]. R WSP is the name
of the spare DRBD construct in our formalized DRBD [5] and ALL DISTINCT [Y Xa
Xd] ensures that the inputs cannot fail at the same time.
In order to use these verified expressions in Table 6, we need to verify that the
DRBD event and the DFT event possess complementary sets in the probability space.
We formally verify this as:
Theorem 3. ` ∀p X t. prob space p ∧ (DFT event p X t) ∈ events p ⇒
Figure 5: Integrated Framework for Formal DFT-DRBD Analysis using HOL4
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Table 6: Verified Equivalence of DFT Gates and DRBD Algebra
DFT Gate DRBD Operator/Construct Verified Theorem
AND OR ` ∀X Y. D AND X Y = R OR X Y
OR AND ` ∀X Y. D OR X Y = R AND X Y
FDEP AND ` ∀X Y. FDEP X Y = R AND X Y
PAND Inclusive After
` ∀X Y. P AND X Y =
R INCLUSIVE AFTER Y X
Spare Spare
` ∀Xa Xd Y.
(∀s. ALL DISTINCT [Y s;Xa s;Xd s]) ⇒
(WSP Y Xa Xd = R WSP Y Xa Xd)
(prob p (DRBD event p X t) = 1 - prob p (DFT event p X t))
where the conditions ensure that p is a probability space and that the DFT event
belongs to the events of the probability space. This theorem can be verified also if we
ensure that the DRBD event belongs to the probability space. This theorem means that
for the same time to failure function, the DRBD and DFT events are the complements
of each other. This way, we can analyze DFTs using the DRBD algebra and vice-versa.
Based on the verification results obtained in Table 6, DFT gates can be formally
represented using DRBDs. We show that the amount of effort required by the verifi-
cation engineer to formally analyze DFTs by analyzing its counterpart DRBD is less
than that of analyzing the original DFT model. In Section 2, a DFT is formally an-
alyzed using the DFT algebra by expressing the DFT event of the structure function
as the union of the individual DFT events. Then the probabilistic PIE is utilized to
formally verify the probability of failure of the top event. The number of terms in the
final result equals 2n − 1, where n is the number of individual events in the union of
the structure function. Therefore, in the verification process, it is required to verify at
least 2n− 1 expressions. On the other hand, verifying a DRBD would require verifying
a single expression for each nested structure.
As an example, consider the reliability analysis of the DBW system. Analyzing the
DFT of this system required verifying 63 subgoals as the top event is composed of the
union of six different events. While analyzing the DRBD of the DBW system required
verifying only one main subgoal to be manipulated to reach the final goal. Table 7
provides a comparison of the size of the script, the required time to develop it and the
number of goals to be verified. Based on these observations, analyzing the reliability
of the DBW using the DRBD required 1/24 of the time needed by the DFT. These
results show that it is more convenient to analyze the DRBD of a system rather than
its DFT if the algebraic approaches are to be used. The only added step will be to
formally verify that the DFT and DRBD are the complements of each other, which is
straightforward utilizing the theorems in Table 6. Therefore, we verify this as:
Theorem 4. ` ∀p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t.
prob space p ∧ DBW events p p TF EF BCU PC SCa SCd TS BS t ⇒.
(prob p (DRBD event p FDBW t) = 1- prob p (DFT event p QDBW t))
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Table 7: Comparison of Formal Analysis Efforts of DBW
# of subgoals # of lines in the script required time
DFT 63 4850 24 hours
DRBD 1 150 1 hour
where DBW events p ensures that the DBW DFT events are in the events of the prob-
ability space. Thus, we can use the DRBD reliability expression (Theorem 2) to verify
the probability of failure of the DFT, which results in a reduction in the analysis efforts.
5 Conclusions
In this report, we proposed an integrated framework to enable the multiway formal
algebraic analysis of DFTs and DRBDs within a theorem prover. This framework allows
transforming a DFT and DRBD models into their corresponding DBRD and DFT
models, respectively, to be either analyzed more effectively using the DRBD algebra
or to clearly observe the failure dependencies in the form of a DFT. This requires
formally verifying the equivalence of both DFT and DRBD algebras. To illustrate the
efficiency and usefulness of the proposed framework, we provided a comparison of the
efforts required to analyze a drive-by-wire system and the results showed that using
the DRBD in the analysis instead of DFTs required verifying less goals (1:63), smaller
script size (150:4850) and less time (1h:24h).
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